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Foucault and Feminist Philosophy Now 
Michel Foucault died nearly thirty years ago, in 1984.  He enjoyed widespread intellectual ce-
lebrity in France, and, towards the end of his life, in the United States, but his influence on the 
emerging field of feminist studies was minimal until well after his death.  This is noteworthy 
only because of his overt queerness and engagement with radical politics during his life; Fou-
cault quickly became the most influential twentieth century commentator on the politics of 
sexuality, yet his grasp of feminist politics seems tenuous, and his overt pronouncements, as 
well as the tacit implications of his writing, have long been labelled sexist.  On the other hand, 
there is by now an enormous literature that takes up the implications of his work for femi-
nism, without worrying too much about whether Foucault would have approved.  The field 
has matured, in other words, and still has potential: the relatively long delay between Fou-
cault’s death and the publication of his lectures (and various ephemeral essays, speeches, and 
interviews) as well as the even longer interval in getting all this work translated into English 
means that the reception of his ideas in 2013 still feels ongoing, open to debate, and unre-
solved. 
In this context, the time seemed ripe for a special issue of Foucault Studies devoted to 
the interface of feminist theory and the ongoing interpretation of Foucault’s oeuvre.  The five 
articles published here represent only a small part of this work.  They discuss a range of is-
sues, from Foucault’s potential to motivate and undergird a queer feminism, to his incipient 
critique of neoliberalism, to his last work on the ethics of self and desubjectivation.  In this in-
troduction, I very briefly lay out the history of Foucault’s relation to feminist scholarship and 
politics, and survey the various strands of recent literature.  My focus—and that of the arti-
cles—is with Foucault’s relation to the methods and questions of feminist philosophy.  This 
emphasis has proved to be an interesting one.  While the essays here do discuss some specific 
examples of feminist problems and interventions (the economy of sex work, or how to re-
spond to sexual violence, for example) they are by and large concerned with the deeper con-
ceptual bases of Foucault’s corpus.  Rather than featuring a slogan or fragment from Fou-
cault’s enormous output and then running an empirical analysis that would have been much 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Chloë Taylor for the original invitation to guest edit this special issue, as well as eight 
anonymous reviewers, the contributing authors, and everyone at Foucault Studies (especially Jyoti Puri, su-
pervising editor) for their generous assistance. 




the same without it—as scholars across the humanities and social sciences have been prone to 
do—the essays here ask carefully after his larger ideas and how they cohere with feminist the-
oretical goals.  They ask, for example, whether feminist thinkers should fully embrace a project 
of desubjectivation, or should retain a commitment to norms of reason; what form of critique 
would enable us to reverse the transposition of social justice into a realm of economics-as-
truth; or how Foucault’s ethics represents a form of queer thinking.  In doing so they may be 
relatively inattentive to particulars: in which nation states or economic sectors is the critique of 
neoliberalism most powerful?  How do the complex genealogies of postcolonial and indige-
nous subjects with regard to norms of reason influence any feminist account?  My hope, then, 
is that this special issue will encourage more serious scholars of Foucault to variegate, specify, 
and challenge these analyses, bringing the interface of Foucault studies and feminist studies 
into a new and exciting phase. 
 
Foucault the (Anti-)Feminist 
Foucault had relatively little to say about the second-wave feminism that was one of the key 
political movements of his time.  To give one of not many examples, he was asked in a late 
interview that focused on his sexual politics whether he endorsed the distinctions between 
“male and female homosexuality” made by “American” “radical feminists”—the different 
physical acts that characterize the two forms of sexual encounter, and the proposition that 
“lesbians seem in the main the want from other women what one finds in stable heterosexual 
relationships: support, affection, long-term commitment, and so on.”  In his initial response 
Foucault “[Laughs],” then says, “all I can do is explode with laughter.”  The puzzled inter-
viewer follows up: “Is the question funny in a way I don’t see, or stupid, or both?”  Foucault 
replies again: 
 
Well, it is certainly not stupid, but I find it very amusing, perhaps for reasons I couldn’t give 
even if I wanted to.  What I will say is that the distinction offered doesn’t seem to be con-
vincing, in terms of what I observe in the behavior of lesbian women.  Beyond this, one 
would have to speak about the different pressures experienced by men and women who are 
coming out or are trying to make a life for themselves as homosexuals.  I don’t think that 
radical feminists in other countries are likely to see these questions quite in the way you as-
cribe to such women in American intellectual circles.2   
 
Foucault is cryptic here.  On the one hand, his response could be taken as a sympathetic nod to 
the diversity of lesbian experience, the traditionalism embedded in the question, and the way 
experiences are mutually constituted by gendered relations of power.  On the other, it could be 
read as ignorance of the postulates of contemporary radical feminism, and a denial of the sali-
ence of femininity as a ubiquitous (if variable) structuring subjectivity.  That the former inter-
pretation is not only charitable but correct is supported by Foucault’s more thoughtful state-
ment that: 
 
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” [1982] in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjec-
tivity, and Truth (New York: New Press, 1997), 145. 
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The real strength of the women’s liberation movements is not that of having laid claim to the 
specificity of their sexuality and the rights pertaining to it, but that they have actually de-
parted from the discourse conducted within the apparatuses of sexuality… Ultimately, [they 
have led to] a veritable movement of desexualization, a displacement effected in relation to 
the sexual centering of the problem, formulating the demand for forms of culture, discourse, 
language, and so on, which are no longer part of that rigid assignation and pinning-down to 
their sex which they had initially in some sense been politically obliged to accept in order to 
make themselves heard.3 
 
Here Foucault clearly praises feminism for identifying and undermining the forced sexual 
subjectivity within a forced discourse of sexuality that was (and, in some ways, remains) a 
pressing political problem. 
There are many moments when Foucault speaks like this, and not only in his comments 
on gender.  Often one can sense him juggling competing claims, and pondering the political 
implications of making any sort of definitive pronouncements.  It is partly for this reason that 
Foucault’s relation to feminist politics has remained contested for so long.  This contestation 
takes its sharpest form in engagement with Foucault’s remarks on sexual violence—and espe-
cially sex crimes—which for many years were taken to be the most overt form of his political 
incompatibility with feminism.  In a 1977 essay written for the Parisian anti-psychiatry group 
Collectif Change, Foucault famously stated that “when one punishes rape one should be pun-
ishing physical violence and nothing but that.  And to say that it is nothing more than an act of 
aggression: that there is no difference, in principle, between sticking one’s fist into someone’s 
face or one’s penis into their sex.”4  His blunt remark emerges, of course, from his then-
recently published critique of the repressive hypothesis in History of Sexuality Volume 1, as well 
as his earlier work on madness and the rise of psychiatry as a forensic strategy of power.  Fou-
cault believed that state legislation of sexuality and the interventions of the criminal justice 
system into “sex crimes” would only further entrench normalizing judgments and practices of 
domination.  While violence simpliciter—whatever that is—should be punished (and it is not 
clear why he makes this claim in this quote), to imbue sex crimes with some special affect, so-
matic implication, or political consequence, was, he thought, to contribute further to the hold 
of disciplinary power over our bodies, the sex/sexuality of which such power had helped to 
form and limit.   
In keeping with this position, Foucault also endorsed the decriminalization of consen-
sual sexual acts, including between adults and minors.  In a 1978 radio interview (alongside 
Guy Hocquenghem and Jean Danet), he defended his view, arguing that psychiatric and judi-
cial engagement with sex crimes risked creating the very kind of deviant subjects it purported 
to classify and punish, while treating children’s sexuality paternalistically.  These “dangerous 
                                                 
3 Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh,” [1977] in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (New York: Vintage, 1980), 219-220.  The first quote is from an inter-
view conducted in 1982, while the second is from 1977. Thus another way of reading them is to note that 
Foucault was perhaps increasingly exasperated with under-informed interviewers who asked him to specu-
late about women’s sexuality and liberation. 
4 Later published in English as “Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison,” in Lawrence Kritzman (ed.), Politics, Phi-
losophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984 (New York: Routledge, 1988).  Quote is from page 99. 




individuals” would then be seen as having a generically dangerous sexuality; the pedophile is 
the main example, but Foucault is also concerned about the too-quick assumption of an equiv-
alence between the perversion of homosexuality and that of pedophilia, as well as the state’s 
homophobic eagerness to prosecute gay men who had sex with boys just below the age of con-
sent.5  Throughout this period of his career Foucault was particularly interested in thinking 
critically about adult-child sexual relationships—a formation he also explored in his treatment 
of the 1867 case of Charles Jouy in History of Sexuality.  Jouy, as most of us now know all too 
well, was described there as a “somewhat simple-minded” “farm hand” who “obtained a few 
caresses” from a little girl.  The girl’s parents reported him to the mayor, who in turn reported 
him to the police, and thence to a judge.  Jouy ended up the subject of medical experts who 
wrote a report on his physiognomy and psychology and shut him up in a psychiatric hospital: 
“a pure object of medicine and knowledge.”  “What is the significant thing about this story?”  
Foucault asks.  “The pettiness of it all; the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of vil-
lage sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the 
object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, a care-
ful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical elaboration.”6  
From these best-known moments it is probably already clear that Foucault was in some 
conflict—both explicit and tacit—with his feminist contemporaries.  As early as May 1978, 
Monique Plaza, in the journal Questions Féministes, sharply criticizes Foucault’s remarks on 
rape:  
 
What exactly is rape? ...Rape is an oppressive practice exercised by a (social) man against a (social) 
woman… If men rape women, it is precisely because they are socially women, or… because 
they are “the sex”—i.e. they have bodies that men have already appropriated by exercising 
the “local tactic” of nameless violence.  Rape is essentially sexual because it rests on the very 
social difference of the sexes.  
Therefore, using the reversals and the paradoxes Foucault likes so much, I would say: If 
someone sticks his fist in someone else’s face, or his penis in their sex, there’s a difference: 
the difference between the sexes.  Men rape women to the extent that they belong to the 
class of men, which appropriates for itself the bodies of women.  They rape those they have 
learned to think of as their property, i.e. those individuals of the other sex class, the class of 
women (which, I repeat, may also contain biological men).7  
 
                                                 
5 This interview is published in English as “Sexual Morality and the Law,” in Lawrence Kritzman (ed.), Poli-
tics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984 (New York: Routledge, 1988).   
6 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge [1976] (New York: Random House, 
1978), 31-32. 
7 Monique Plaza, “Nos dommages et leurs interest,” Questions Féministes 3, May (1978), 93-103, 97, my trans-
lation.  Italics in original.  See also the comments on Plaza and more ambivalent treatment of Foucault in 
Biddy Martin, “Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault,” New German Critique, No. 27, Autumn (1982), 3-30, as 
well as Cahill’s reconsideration of the same issue in Ann J. Cahill, “Foucault, Rape, and the Construction of 
the Feminine Body,” Hypatia 15:1 (2000), 43-63. 
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Fast forward eighteen years (and through several less well known feminist discussions of re-
lated issues8 to Linda Alcoff’s widely cited “Dangerous Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of 
Pedophilia.”9  Alcoff takes up Foucault’s defence of consensual sex involving minors and his 
apparent trivialization of the girl’s experience in the Jouy case, to argue that he inconsistently 
places (male, adult) pleasure outside of discourse, as a resistant force against domination.  In 
the latter part of the essay she also offers a complex reading of the US context, highlighting 
many subtleties of the dynamics of exploitation, and showing how social organization (con-
tingently) makes sexual contact with children into damaging abuse, especially when combined 
with “the phenomenology of sex itself, which involves uniquely sensitive, vulnerable, and 
psychically important areas of the body, a fact that persists across cultural differences.”10  
Alcoff’s reading was based on the France-Culture interview and History of Sexuality; on-
ly in 2003 were Foucault’s 1974-5 lectures published in English translation under the title Ab-
normal.  In these lectures, as Jana Sawicki points out in her review, Foucault discusses a second 
sexual encounter between Jouy and the now-named Sophie Adam:  
 
Jouy dragged young Sophie Adam (unless it was Sophie Adam who dragged Charles Jouy) 
into the ditch alongside the road to Nancy.  There, something happened: almost rape, per-
haps.  Anyway, Jouy very decently gives four sous to the little girl who immediately runs to 
the fair to buy some roasted almonds.11 
 
As Sawicki correctly predicted, this disclosure—arguably minimized again in the lecture but 
tellingly omitted altogether from History of Sexuality—has fueled the flames of this controversy 
rather than dousing them.12  Chloë Taylor considers all of Foucault’s treatments of violence 
and gender (including the matricide Pierre Rivière) to argue in great detail (and with full ref-
erence to his more recently translated texts) that “some of the aspects of existence that Fou-
                                                 
8 Martin; Winnifred Woodhull, “Sexuality, Power, and the Question of Rape,” in Irene Diamond and Lee 
Quinby, (eds.), Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 
167-176; Kate Soper, “Productive Contradictions,” in Caroline Ramazanoglu (ed.), Up Against Foucault: Ex-
plorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993),  29-50; 
Laura Hengehold, “An Immodest Proposal: Foucault, Hysterization, and the ‘Second Rape,’” Hypatia 9:3 
(1994), 88-107. 
9 Linda Martin Alcoff, “Dangerous Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Pedophilia,” in Susan Hekman 
(ed.), Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 
1996), 99-136; see also Linda Martin Alcoff, “Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and Feminist Theory on the 
Concept of Experience,” in Linda Fisher and Leslie Embree (eds.), Feminist Phenomenology (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2000), 39-56. 
10 Alcoff, “Dangerous Pleasures,” 127-8. 
11 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, edited by Valerio Marchetti and An-
tonella Salomoni, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 292.  In the original French, the 
phrase translated in the Picador edition as “almost rape, perhaps,” is “moitié viol, peut-être.”  It is elsewhere 
translated, including by Kelly Ball in her 2013 article of the same title, as “more or less raped.”  See Kelly 
Ball, “‘More or Less Raped:’ Foucault, Causality, and Feminist Critiques of Sexual Violence,” philoSOPHIA: A 
Journal of Continental Feminism 3:1 (2013), 52-68. 
12 Jana Sawicki, “Review of Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975,” Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23977/?id=1581, 2005. 




cault fails to see in his dogged focus on what he reads as agonistic medical-legal battles and 
power relations between men include the family, gender relations, victimization of women 
and children, suffering, and love.”13  This is a nuanced treatment, but others are more partisan, 
and the feminist pendulum may be swinging back to Foucault’s side: Holly Henderson sug-
gests that Foucault’s account of rape as violence could inform a feminist account of rape pre-
vention14; Johanna Oksala has attempted to recuperate Foucault’s account of (sexual) experi-
ence from Alcoff’s critique (while acknowledging his “male and adult pattern of epistemic 
arrogance”15); and Kelly Ball argues contra Alcoff “that [her] practice of making judgments 
about sexual violence relies upon a concept of causality that is an extension of the modern 
framework of power-knowledge-pleasure,” as Foucault is trying to show us through his am-
bivalent and inconclusive repetitions of the Jouy-Adam case.16   
I could go on, but suffice to say that this extended conversation between Foucault and 
his feminist interlocutors has lasted more than thirty years because of the complexity and (un-
fortunately) persistent topicality of political analyses of sexuality, power, gender, and vio-
lence.17  It is a conversation that places Foucault’s actual words in relationship with various 
forms of feminism, and gives me some confidence that his overall political analyses remain 
salient—perhaps more than ever—even if he is sometimes glosses over the experience of 
women and girls in his specific examples.  The other genre of feminist critique to which Fou-
cault has been subject is equally familiar: while sometimes trivializing the particulars of femi-
nine subjectivities, more often he simply generalizes from his genealogies of populations of 
men.  As Sandra Bartky famously argued in her germinal essay “Foucault, Femininity, and the 
Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” 
 
Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily experiences of men and 
women did not differ and as if men and women bore the same relationship to the character-
istic institutions of modern life.  Where is the account of the disciplinary practices that en-
gender the “docile bodies” of women, bodies more docile than the bodies of men? ...To over-
look the forms of subjection that engender the feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and 
powerlessness of those upon whom those disciplines have been imposed.  Hence, even 
though a liberatory note is sounded in Foucault’s critique of power, his analysis as a whole 
reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout Western political theory.18   
 
                                                 
13 Chloë Taylor, “Infamous Men, Dangerous Individuals, and Violence Against Women: Feminist Re-
readings of Foucault,” in A Companion to Foucault, edited by Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana 
Sawicki (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 419-435, 433. 
14 Holly Henderson, “Feminism, Foucault, and Rape: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention,” Berkeley 
Journal of Gender, Law, and Justice, 22 (2007), 225-253.   
15 Johanna Oksala, “Sexual Experience: Foucault, Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” Hypatia 25:1 (2011), 
2-17, 2.  
16 Ball. 
17 See Adrian Howe, Sex, Violence, and Crime: Foucault and the ‘Man’ Question (New York: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2008). 
18 Sandra Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” in Femininity and 
Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), 62-82, 65. 
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Two other texts from the early 1990’s, which likewise challenge Foucault’s sexism, simultane-
ously, as Bartky does, extrapolate his work into feminist territory.  Note that Jana Sawicki’s 
early book is titled Disciplining Foucault19, as if Foucault were an errant schoolboy, while an 
early collection of critical feminist essays on Foucault is called Up Against Foucault20, as if he 
were a boxing opponent.21  At least among serious scholars of Foucault, debate has moved on 
from the tired questions of whether his “postmodernism” is compatible with feminist posi-
tions, whether he was a political sellout in turning to ethics at the end of his life, and whether 
his refusal of normative or programmatic statements precludes him being a responsible inter-
locutor.22  But where has it gone? 
 
Recent Feminist Scholarship on Foucault 
Although he is often represented as an antagonist for feminists in this earlier literature, it was 
always the case that Foucault’s work was appropriated for feminist purposes without either 
close or obedient reading.  Judith Butler famously offers us a Foucault re-read through, at var-
ious points, ordinary language philosophy and psychoanalysis, taking up his antifoundation-
alist position on sexuality and discourse and his methods of critique, while reinserting the per-
formative significance of speech-acts and “the psychic life of power.”23  Foucault has been tak-
en to be a useful commentator for feminist thinking on psychopathology, gender, and cul-
ture24; the family25; on racial formations and gender26; on gender and sexuality in the context of 
                                                 
19 Jana Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
20 Caroline Ramazanoglu (ed.), Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Femi-
nism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 
21 Other collections of feminist essays on Foucault include Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby, (eds.), Feminism 
and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988); Susan Hekman (ed.), Re-
Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1996); 
Dianna Taylor and Karen Vintges (eds.), Feminism and The Final Foucault (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2004). 
22 For discussions situating and engaging these questions, see Margaret McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and 
Embodied Subjectivity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004); Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, 
and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Dianna Taylor, 
“Normativity and Normalization,” Foucault Studies 7 (2009), 45-63. 
23 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990); Judith 
Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Studies in Subjection (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Judith 
Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in David Ingram (ed.), The Political: Blackwell 
Readings in Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
24 Susan Bordo, “Anorexia Nervosa: Pyschopathology as the Crystallization of Culture,” in Unbearable 
Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 139-164; Cres-
sida Heyes, “Diagnosing Culture: Body Dysmorphic Disorder and Cosmetic Surgery,” Body and Society, 15:4 
(2009), 73-93; Lynn Huffer, Mad For Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009); Cressida J. Heyes and Chloë Taylor, “Between Disciplinary Power and Care of the 
Self: A Dialogue on Foucault and the Psychological Sciences,” PhaenEx 5:2 (2010), 179-209. 
25 Ellen Feder, Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Chloë 
Taylor, “Foucault and Familial Power,” Hypatia 27:1 (2012), 201-218.   
26 Feder; Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexism in Anglo-America: A Genealogy (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 2009). 




(post-)colonialism27; and as a thinker whose political biography as it relates to his method as a 
philosopher of practices might inform a related, feminist approach.28 
If there are any trends in the last decade of this scholarship, they crystallize around 
three themes: Foucault’s account of subjectivity and of desubjectivation as it relates to his 
methods of genealogy and critique, and especially to his last (and less well explored) work on 
ethics29; reevaluations of his work on sexuality and the attempt to delineate a “queer femi-
nism;”30 and the growing conversation around Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism and their 
relation to biopolitics.31  Of these, the latter likely needs the most contextualization, not least 
since Foucault has only recently been read as an economic commentator.  For example, in her 
2003 critique, Nancy Fraser suggests that “if we now see ourselves as standing on the brink of 
a new, postfordist epoch of globalization”32 then we need to reconsider Foucault’s corpus (es-
pecially the middle works that have been most influential in political thought) as grasping the 
logic of social regulation—like the Owl of Minerva—on the cusp of a major transformation in 
economic systems:  
 
From this perspective, it is significant that his great works of social analysis…were written 
in the 1960s and 1970s, just as the OECD countries abandoned Bretton Woods, the interna-
tional financial framework that undergirded national Keynesianism and thus made possible 
the welfare state.  In other words, Foucault mapped the contours of the disciplinary society 
just as the ground was being cut out from under it.  And although it is only now with hind-
sight becoming clear, this was also the moment at which discipline’s successor was strug-
                                                 
27 Laura Ann Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of 
Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); and see Robert Nichols, “Postcolonial Studies and the 
Discourse of Foucault: Survey of a Field of Problematization,” Foucault Studies 9 (2010), 111-144. 
28 Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 1999); Mariana Valverde, “Experience and Truth-Telling in a Post-humanist World: 
A Foucauldian Contribution to Feminist Ethical Reflections,” in Taylor and Vintges (ed.), 67-90; Cressida J. 
Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
29 E.g. Dianna Taylor and Karen Vintges; Johanna Oksala, “Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist 
Question of Experience,” Hypatia 19:4 (2004), 97-119; Oksala, “Sexual Experience.” 
30 See Shannon Winnubst, Queering Freedom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Huffer; and the 
articles in the special issue of Foucault Studies 14, 2012 (on Foucault and queer theory, guest edited by Shan-
non Winnubst and Jana Sawicki). 
31 See Lois McNay, “Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault’s The Birth of Biopoli-
tics,” Theory, Culture, and Society 26:6 (2009), 55-77; the articles in the special issue of Foucault Studies 6, Febru-
ary 2009 (on neoliberal governmentality); 2010 interview with Nancy Fraser at 
http://www.againstthegrain.org/program/274/id/041516/wed-1-27-10-feminism-and-neoliberalism; Ladelle 
McWhorter, “Darwin’s Invisible Hand: Feminism, Reprogenetics, and Foucault’s Analysis of Neoliberalism,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2010), 43-63; Andrew Dilts, “From ‘Entrepreneur of the Self’ to ‘Care of 
the Self’: Neo-liberal Governmentality and Foucault’s Ethics,” Foucault Studies 12 (2011), 130-146; Johanna 
Oksala, “Violence and Neoliberal Governmentality,” Constellations 18:3 (2011), 474-486; and the 2012 Univer-
sity of Chicago seminar “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker,” which can viewed at 
http://vimeo.com/43984248 or downloaded in edited form at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2142163. 
32 Nancy Fraser, “From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization,” 
Constellations 10:2 (2003), 160-171. 
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gling to be born.  The irony is plain: whether we call it postindustrial society or neoliberal 
globalization, a new regime oriented to “deregulation” and “flexibilization” was about to 
take shape just as Foucault was conceptualizing disciplinary normalization.33   
 
It is ironic that a thinker as deeply committed to undoing our own presentism as Foucault 
should be vulnerable to this charge.  Fraser is surely right that Foucault did not fully foresee 
the neoliberal turn of the 1980s or imagine its long-term consequences.  Nonetheless, his un-
timely death in 1984 hardly makes this a reasonable expectation.  Further, Foucault did speak 
and write insightfully and at some length on postwar neoliberalism in his 1978-9 lecture 
course at the Collège de France, published as La Naissance de la Biopolitique [The Birth of Biopoli-
tics] in 2004 (2008 in English translation), which Fraser could not have read prior to making 
her critique.   
In this series Foucault has two foci: first, on German post-war economic reconstruction, 
which he argues represents “a new programming of liberal governmentality,” within which 
the market economy became the guide of governmental action: “the problem of neo-liberalism 
is…how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the principles of a market 
economy.  So it is not a question of freeing an empty space, but of taking the formal principles 
of a market economy and referring and relating them to, of projecting them on to a general art 
of government.”34  His second focus is on the twentieth century US neo-liberalism of, most 
notably, Gary Becker.  In Becker he identifies homo oeconomicus—the individual who is an en-
trepreneur of himself35—and who has “human capital” through a series of investments made 
by himself and others.  Human flourishing, neoliberal proponents imply, is best supported by 
creating an institutional context in which each individual can best exercise his entrepreneurial 
capacities and make his own unfettered, rational choices.  This context includes minimally 
restricted markets, trade, and unconstrained rights to accumulate capital.  While all these re-
main important features of contemporary political economy, in the last forty years neoliberal-
ism has become more a set of anti-Keynesian political and economic practices that no longer 
require systematic empirical or conceptual defence.  While the state plays a role in developing 
this practice, neoliberals typically view state intervention with suspicion (at least, as we’ve 
seen recently, state intervention on behalf of the poor or even the middle classes.  State sup-
port for the very wealthy is necessary for economic sustainability, apparently).  Increasingly, 
political economic institutions (e.g. central banks, regulatory overseers) have been moved by 
neoliberals outside the realm of state control.  Critics of neoliberalism have pointed out that it 
creates a dwindling but ever more powerful economic elite, and an ever-larger economic un-
derclass, both within nation states and on a global level.   
This history is important scene-setting both for Foucault studies now, and for the es-
says that follow.  At first, the three themes I identified (desubjectivation and ethics, queer fem-
inism, and neoliberalism) might seem unrelated—or, at least, directions for Foucault scholar-
ship inspired only by the late translation of some of the lecture series.  In fact, I think they are 
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linked, and form an important indicator of the political and economic context of contemporary 
academic feminists working in a theoretical vein with Foucault in English.  As the articles in 
this issue illuminate, neoliberalism renders more and more of our lives into a series of flat-
tened, affectless quasi-economic transactions—for privileged westerners, a self-oriented but 
ultimately self-destroying project of cultivating our specialness and human capital in the face 
of ever-greater exploitation and consumerist rhetoric.  In the face of this flattening and the 
gross material exploitation that accompanies it for more and more of us, we obviously need to 
reclaim radical critique of economics, bringing the zone of the politically unquestionable back 
into one of vigorous, democratic challenge.  As part of this project, we have become more in-
terested in critical genealogies of the subjectivities presented to us as inevitable or natural.  
While previous feminist commentators might have attempted to recoup notions of authentici-
ty, such efforts now feel inflationary, as if the very idea of a feminist self comes via a new sales 
pitch in which we work harder, “lean in,” embrace the commodification of our bodies, and 
aspire only to individual success.  The dangers of specifying the content of “women’s experi-
ence” (including endless recycling through the market mechanisms we were trying to ques-
tion) have made many academic feminists interested in what is left of experience, and how 
deflating the subject might prove a useful resistance strategy (or, how more modest and im-
manent norms of reason or autonomy might be salvaged).  Finally, one of the few areas of po-
litical life where genuinely challenging and novel understandings of self and community have 
emerged has been queer politics.  The intrinsic challenge of “queer” to the identity political 
formations that struggled to be responsive to their own genealogies fits it for the task of cri-
tique.  Queerness is perhaps sufficiently flexible and slippery that it both mimics and under-
cuts neoliberalism’s ersatz love of individual distinctiveness, while offering in its practices 
(such as new kinship and family forms, new ways of making and raising children, new ways 
of networking and creating social life, a new sexual ethics, new understandings of space and 
time) ways of living that resist its imperatives. 
 
The Special Issue 
The five articles in this special issue engage Foucault’s writing throughout his life, from a criti-
cal reexamination of the significance of the History of Madness36 for queer feminism, through 
the 1979 lectures on neoliberalism, to an appropriation of his late remarks on parrhesia.  Amy 
Allen’s article takes up the question of whether feminists (especially those who are readers of 
Foucault) should reject norms of reason as part of a project of desubjectivation in the name of 
freedom.  This challenge, she points out, has long presented feminist thinkers with a double 
bind.  On the one hand, we can refuse reason as an “Enlightenment” ruse that has functioned 
through the rejection of the feminine, and risk reinforcing the long history of claims that wom-
en are irrational while losing reason’s potentially strategic and empowering functions in 
communicative action.  On the other hand, we can posit reason as only contingently phallogo-
centric, and argue that feminist critics should position ourselves as within its remit—thus risk-
ing our participation in a political language always already organized around our constitutive 
exclusion.  Allen reinterprets and updates this debate through her reading of Lynn Huffer’s 
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recent book Mad For Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory.37  Huffer, Allen ar-
gues, remains caught in this double bind, her important and original interpretation of History 
of Madness notwithstanding.  By linking madness explicitly to queerness (both historically and 
politically) Huffer is able to mount a queer feminist interpretation of Foucault in which he is 
presenting reason as a “despotic” force, freedom from which can only appear in the form of a 
kind of unreason, or madness.  Allen offers a close reading of this aspect of Huffer’s text in the 
service of both showing the contemporary salience of an old ambivalence in feminist thought, 
and challenging Huffer’s Foucault.  Instead, Allen articulates a Foucault who implicitly, and 
more soberly, advises feminists that we practice critique with regard to those norms of reason 
in which we have no choice but to be implicated. 
Three of the five essays engage directly with Foucault on neoliberalism.  Johanna Oksa-
la, in “Feminism and Neoliberal Governmentality,” argues that socialist feminist critiques of 
poststructuralism as an ineffective tool for challenging neoliberalism fail to understand Fou-
cault’s distinctive contribution.  Tracing leftist critiques of poststructuralism as overly con-
cerned with language, focused at the level of the individual, and unable to provide structural 
analyses of late capitalism, Oksala responds with a defence of Foucault.  His 1979 lectures 
provide, she argues, a convincing account of neoliberal governmentality that places its roots in 
the early self-proclaimed science of economics.  By showing how specifying a claim as “eco-
nomic” transposes it from a discourse of justice to one of truth, and how the realm of the eco-
nomic has gradually expanded into the social and political, Oksala’s Foucault is able to show 
how neoliberal governmentality represents itself as outside politics and undercuts modes of 
political objection (including feminist critique).  A key part of expanding the domain of the 
economic is the construction of a neoliberal subject: one of the ways that structural feminist 
analyses are undercut, Oksala argues, is through the constitution of a feminine neoliberal in-
dividual who is rationally self-interested, maximizes her own utility, and makes free choices—
primarily through consumer purchasing, untrammelled heterosexual expression, and competi-
tive and self-interested economic behaviour.  Reading Foucault can teach us to more effective-
ly unpack the tension between the imposition of unrealistic and oppressive norms onto wom-
en, and our constitution through (and even embrace of) those norms.  Oksala briefly concludes 
with the example of sex work, to show how a Foucauldian-feminist approach can avoid capit-
ulating to neoliberal ontology by viewing sex work solely as a set of market transactions, 
without falling back on a human rights discourse that cannot grasp the genealogy of the pros-
titute.   
Ladelle McWhorter also addresses the implications of Foucault’s thinking for feminist 
critiques of neoliberalism, but taking a different tack.  She argues that Foucault’s account of 
domination is sufficiently similar to feminist accounts of oppression at least to make the two ini-
tially comparable, making her case through readings of Marilyn Frye and Iris Marion Young’s 
classic analyses.  She goes on to show that these structural analyses are paradigmatically in-
compatible with Friedrich von Hayek’s libertarianism, according to which “oppression” can 
only be understood as acts of direct coercion between individuals.  This position has received 
extraordinary uptake within contemporary neoliberal economic regimes, discrediting (rather 
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than disproving) any analysis of oppression as a relation between social groups.  Foucault’s 
analytics of power, McWhorter argues, provides a strategic grammar for rethinking feminist 
resistance to oppression—a term that uncritical acceptance of neoliberal dogma has rendered 
“impotent.”  Effective resistance, for Foucault, occurs in three registers: “intensification of spe-
cific forces to overcome opposing resistance.  …mobilizing forces at right angles, so to speak, 
to specific power relations as a means to disrupt or redirect them.  And …developing what 
Foucault calls ‘practices of freedom’.”  McWhorter explores this last option, arguing that con-
temporary feminism should be centrally concerned with what Foucault considered to be “eth-
ics:” the relation of self to self, understood as a communal problem and practice, and con-
cerned with developing enhanced capacities for the future, rather than batting around the dis-
course on oppression. 
Jana Sawicki’s article approaches critique of neoliberalism more obliquely, through the 
connection with queerness I hinted at earlier.  She defends a queer feminism as “an eccentric, 
provocative and unruly… practice, one able to risk, challenge and transform itself, any static 
sense of its beloved objects and self-understandings, its sense of temporal and spatial orders.” 
The way Foucault thinks, she argues, can be understood as a model for this kind of critique.  
Sawicki explores how Foucault’s last work on the ethics of concern for self as a practice of 
freedom might be distinct from the kind of enterprising self cultivated by neoliberal ideology.   
Finally, a similar concern with desubjectivation through Foucault’s ethical thinking is 
found in Dianna Taylor’s “Resisting the Subject: A Feminist-Foucauldian Approach to Coun-
tering Sexual Violence.”  Taylor argues that the necessary implication of subjectivization with 
normalizing judgment can be resisted.  While most feminists take the view that challenging 
sexual violence—both as a social phenomenon, and as an individual experience—requires that 
women assert our position as subjects, Taylor suggests that “subjectivity” (as Foucault under-
stands it) is a historically specific and politically ambivalent way of constituting and being 
constituted as a self.  She turns to Foucault’s later work on the relation of self to self to find 
that methods of desubjectifying oneself, including as a victim of sexual violence, can have sur-
prising and positive consequences.  Contrasting the confessional and the parrhesiastic modes 
of speaking, Taylor closely analyzes the activism of the Garneau Sisterhood, a group of femi-
nists in a Canadian city who anonymously protested the actions of a neighbourhood serial 
rapist and the inadequate police response to his assaults.  For Taylor, Foucault indirectly offers 
a way of speaking (out) about sexual violence that can be turned to feminist ends.  In this pa-
per and Taylor’s other work on these themes we see, finally, a way of reading Foucault that 
neither dwells on apologia for his insensitivity to the harms of sexual violence, nor decries his 
refusal to specify a subject-position that grounds our liberation. 
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